tion, capital and labor. We assume that these factors can be combined to produce a generic "input" that can in turn be used in the production of both final and intermediate goods; for simplicity we let the production function for this general input be Cobb-Douglas:
We are going to suppose that there are increasing returns to the employment of this input. Rather than simply assume external economies at the level of the economy, however, we derive these increasing returns from a production structure in which "input" is used to produce nontraded intermediate goods 
where Qj is a composite of many symmetric differentiated products,
Each of these differentiated products is produced from the general input, subject to economies of scale:
The total supply of input will be divided between that portion used directly in the final good sector and that part used to assemble nontraded intermediates:
We assume that the final output can be sold on world markets at a fixed price. We also assume that this country is able to borrow or lend freely on world capital markets at a real interest rate in terms of traded goods of r. We will, however, assume that there is costly adjustment of the physical capital stock, giving rise to an investment function that depends on the price of capital in place ("Tobin's q"). We write this investment function as f = /(<?),
where we assume /'>0 and define 1(1) = 0, that is, assume that the capital stock is constant when q = 1.
Determination of output and factor prices
Before we turn to the effects of immigration, we must first show how output and factor prices are determined for given supplies of capital and labor. We begin asking how the value-added of the economy will be divided between the direct input into the final good XF and the intermediate composite Q?. Given the assumed Cobb-Douglas form, this is straightforward: a share y of the value added will be accounted for by direct inputs, 1 -y by the composite. But now we note that under a monopolistically competitive market structure (which we will describe in a moment), profits are zero. Thus all value-added ac? crues to the input X, implying in turn that X is allocated between the two ac? tivities in the same proportions as value-added: XF=yX9 ( ?-i-*-.
? 1-0
The input per good is therefore also fixed: We are now prepared to analyze the economic impacts of immigration.
The dynamics of exogenous immigration
We first consider the effects of an exogenous increase in L. This may be thought of as representing a situation in which potential immigrants are relatively unresponsive to economic incentives, and will come regardless of the real wages they expect to receive.
In the short run, with K predetermined, an increase in L will drive down real wages. Over time, however, the capital stock will rise. Since the capital stock will grow as long as q> 1, in the long run we must have q = It is immediately apparent from this assumption that one possibility is zero immigration: as long as L = L0, the wage rate is too low to attract the im? migrants and there is no incentive to invest. There may, however, also be a steady state in which all of the immigrants come. As we saw in the previous section, if L rises the long-run real wage will also rise. Suppose that with a labor force L0+M and with the capital stock large enough so that R = r the real wage ex? ceeds wM. Then it is clear that if all of the migrants can be persuaded to come and equipped with their long-run capital stock, they will be paid enough to per? suade them to stay. But will the economy get there from here? To answer that, we need to look at the dynamics. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between R and K when there is endogenous immigration. The shape of the curve may be understood as follows. First, point 0 represents the initial equilibrium of the economy. For K in the vicinity of this initial level, the wage rate is too low to attract immigrants, and thus the labor force is fixed at L0. Given a fixed labor force, R is a decreasing function of K. For some sufficiently large K, however, the wage rate equals wM. At this point, shown as Kx any rise in K will be accompanied by a rise in L rather than a rise in w. If we assume that the labor force rises so as to keep w = wM, we find that d?^_\-?l?> .
The combination of a rising ratio of labor to capital and increasing returns will imply a rising rental rate on capital: To understand these figures, we first consider the dynamics of the system in the vicinity of the three equilibrium points 0, 1 and 2. Points 0 and 2 are evidently saddle-path-stable.
In the vicinity of point 1, the linearized dynamic system takes the form In the case shown in Fig. 3 , the market left to itself will shut out the possibility of large immigration. Potential migrants will not have any incentive to come given the low wage; investors will not put in more capital given the absence of any in? crease in the labor force. The only possible way to attract migrants would be through deliberate government policy. In particular, if some policy such as an in? vestment subsidy could raise K to the level K2 or higher, the economy would con? tinue to grow until all potential immigrants had come. 
Conclusions
When political disruptions lead to large-scale immigration, the inflow of labor in?
evitably seems at first like a major economic burden. The economic difficulties experienced by initial waves of migrants may even serve as a deterrent to subse? quent waves, as has apparently been the case for former Soviet residents consider? ing a move to Israel. Yet if there are significant increasing returns in the economy, as there may well be even in nations with high shares of trade in GDP, the long run impact of immigration will often be to raise rather than lower real wages.
In this paper we have offered a simple formalization of the contrast between a difficult short run and a benign long run for countries experiencing large-scale immigration. We have also shown that when immigration is itself affected by the state of the host economy, success in the transition to that long run is not assured. 
